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Abstract: This study investigates how multicultural citizenship education is taught in a Chinese Christian 
school in Jakarta, where multiculturalism is not a natural experience. Schoolyard ethnographic research 
was deployed to explore the reality of a ‘double minority’ — Chinese Christians — and how the 
citizenship of this marginal group is constructed and contested in national, school, and familial 
discourses. The article argues that it is necessary for schools to actively implement multicultural 
citizenship education in order to create a new generation of young adults who are empowered, tolerant, 
active, participatory citizens of Indonesia. As schools are a microcosm of the nation-state, successful 
multicultural citizenship education can have real societal implications for it has the potential to render 
the idealism enshrined in the national motto of ‘Unity in Diversity’ a lived reality. 
 
 
A primary objective of education in the nation-state is the creation of good and responsible citizens. 
Indonesian children generally attend school six days a week for nine years of their lives starting at the age 
of seven. Scholars have hailed education as the single most successful policy for national integration — 
especially in disseminating the national language, Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian), throughout the 
archipelago. Yet, this did not come without a cost: the education system and national curriculum under 
President Suharto's ‘New Order’ authoritarian regime functioned as a vanguard of national unity, often at 
the expense of diversity.1 Lyn Parker writes of how education under the New Order functioned as a tool 
for the legitimisation and reproduction of a ‘whole paternalistic authority system’, which involved 
‘regimes of obedience and silence, acceptance and questioning’.2 Education in the New Order, 1966–98, 
which aimed at making students conform to the political will of the state, used a highly centralised, 
teacher-and textbook-focused system. 
Democratisation and decentralisation brought about through Reformasi has made significant 
changes to national education in Indonesia.3 The stated outcome of the new National Education Act of 
2003 stipulates that education should produce democratic and responsible citizens who are pious and 
believe in God, who are highly moral, in good health, knowledgeable, intelligent, creative and 
independent.4 The statement highlights a shift from authoritarian rule to participatory and democratic 
citizenship where ‘civic identity is no longer seen as the integration of citizens’ wills in a supreme, 
personified state'.5 
The post-Suharto era is also marked by the end to the ideology of cultural assimilation. While 
previously diversity was sacrificed for national unity, now it is celebrated as a unique characteristic of the 
nation. Formerly oppressed identities are now free to express themselves in this new liberal space. The 
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post-Suharto education reform appears to precisely address a point made by Tariq Modood that, 
‘[m]ulticulturalism is clearly beyond toleration and state neutrality, for it involves active support for 
cultural difference, active discouragement against hostility and disapproval and the remaking of the public 
sphere in order to fully include marginalised identities’.6 The National Education Act of 2003 states that 
‘Education is conducted democratically, equally and non-discriminatorily based on human rights, religious 
values, cultural values, and national pluralism’.7 In 2007 the Department of National Education released a 
document entitled ‘The application of the multicultural education model for the secondary level’. This 
serves as a guide to schools on the teaching of multicultural education as a means to promote cultural 
understanding, tolerance and harmonious coexistence.8 Schools have been apprised of the fact that they 
can play an important role in empowering marginalised identities to regain self-confidence as they, of all 
institutions, ‘exercise the most influence on the character formation of young citizens’.9 
What then is the place of Chinese Christian (Protestant) schools in this regard? Are they sites for the 
social reproduction of difference, intolerance and segregation? Will Kymlicka argues that segregated 
religious schools, especially those that are homogenous in their ethnocultural backgrounds and religious 
beliefs, may be limited in their capacity to provide an adequate citizenship education.10 In the same vein, 
Christos Kassimeris and Marios Vryonides argue that ‘it becomes apparent that while education is usually 
perceived as quite an appropriate tool for combating racial discrimination and intolerance, the empirical 
evidence available supports the exact opposite’.11 However, scholars have also recognised the potential 
for religious schools to become significant sites of multicultural citizenship education wherein citizenship 
rights are taught and cultural and religious differences are welcomed and valued.12 The caveat is that, 
more often than not, it is the efforts of individual educators, rather than the school as a whole, that 
promote multicultural and inclusive education on citizenship.13 An appreciation of nuanced dynamics 
within the school is, therefore, important for understanding its contribution to multicultural citizenship 
education. 
Against this backdrop, this study investigates how multicultural citizenship education is taught at a 
Chinese Christian school in Jakarta. It examines the ways in which students express their national, religious 
and ethnic identities, and the extent to which education in the school has fostered a culture of tolerance. 
This study considers whether the school plays a role in empowering its students to integrate into the 
multicultural society of Indonesia, or merely functions as a ‘bubble’ that insulates students from the wider 
community. It also explores the reality of a ‘double minority’ (i.e. Chinese Christians) in Indonesia whose 
citizenship has historically been questioned and whose loyalty doubted, and how their citizenship is 
constructed and contested through national, school, and familial discourses. 
Multiculturalism, citizenship and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
National unity is a primary agenda of Indonesian nation-building for the population comprises more than 
three hundred culturally, geographically, and linguistically diverse ethnic groups. Of this, 88 per cent of 
the population identify as Muslims, around 9 per cent as Protestants and Catholics, and the remaining are 
Hindus, Buddhists and others. The Javanese (41.7 per cent) and Sundanese (15.41 per cent) are the largest 
ethnic groups.14 The ethnic Chinese make up approximately 3 per cent. 
During the New Order, Indonesia's approach to accommodating ethnic and religious plurality may 
broadly be described as pretending that diversity did not exist.15 The national ideology of Pancasila — the 
five principles of belief in one supreme God, humanism, nationalism, popular sovereignty and social 
justice — was promoted as the single basic principle for all mass organisations and sociopolitical forces 
under the regime.16 The purpose of education, according to the General Principles of National Policies 
(GBHN) formulated in 1973, was to cultivate ‘people who can realise the ideals of Pancasila’, which was 
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implemented to support the twin ideologies of anticommunism and economic development.17 Pancasila 
Moral Education (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila), a compulsory subject for all levels of education, was 
introduced to replace civic education in the revised national curriculum of 1975. Messages from the state 
which emphasised the imperative of a stable, orderly and unified society based on Pancasila conducive 
for economic development, and the desirable quality of loyal and good citizens; were presented forcefully 
and continually in classrooms.18 Indonesian citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion and class, were 
assimilated into a constructed homogeneous Pancasila national identity. Consequently, internally diverse 
identities were subsumed and overridden by this imagined national homogeneity. Furthermore, the 
Suharto administration actively prohibited any public discussion related to the four ‘sensitive’ topics 
encapsulated in the acronym, SARA: ethnicity (suku), religion (agama), race (ras) and interclass (antar 
golongan) differences. In short, assimilation was the dominant discourse during the Suharto era. The 
discourse of multiculturalism was only introduced to Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998.19 
While for most nations, citizenship connotes a legal status that differentiates a citizen from a non-
citizen, in postcolonial Indonesia it was internally contestable. Renato Rosaldo's concept of ‘cultural 
citizenship’ describes the power inequalities that are ‘at play in relation to mechanisms of marginalisation 
and exclusion’ among citizens in a single nation.20 Prior to the post-1998 Reform, the term ‘Indonesian 
citizen’ (Warga Negara Indonesia, WNI) was artificial and unrealistic: it was commonly understood to refer 
to the ethnic Chinese, but not other Indonesians. The assumption was that the Chinese are of foreign 
origin and not indigenous (asli). The term ‘WNI’ was understood to be an abbreviation of WNI keturunan 
asing (Indonesian citizen of foreign descent). The use of the word asing (foreign) underlined the alienness 
of Chinese-Indonesians in the eyes of indigenous Indonesians.21 Comparing the term ‘WNI’ with the 
French designation, ‘français de papiers’ (or ‘French by virtue of papers’), which means those people who 
have French citizenship but no other claim to French status, John Bowen argues that the term ‘WNI’ 
implied that the Chinese were merely citizens and that ‘legal citizenship was their only relationship to the 
Indonesian social and political body’.22 
However, this understanding of the citizenship of ethnic Chinese Indonesians began to shift after 
1998. Just before Suharto stepped down as president on 21 May 1998, one of the most devastating anti-
Chinese riots in the nation's history took place. Chinese businesses were looted and Chinese women 
raped. These events demonstrated vividly that Suharto's assimilation policy had failed to accommodate 
the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. With the consideration of multiculturalism in post-Suharto government 
policies, as part and parcel of democracy, many minority cultures suppressed during the Suharto era 
demanded recognition as well as celebration as part of a diverse nation. Ethnic Chinese seized the 
opportunity to fight for the abolition of discriminatory laws and to defend their rights, as well as to liberate 
their long-suppressed identity and cultural heritage.23 
The post-Suharto reforms and ethnic Chinese political activism have allowed the Chinese to retrieve 
considerable cultural and citizenship rights. The most significant has been the endorsement of the new 
Citizenship Law (No. 12/2006) by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 1 August 2006. The 
Clarification of the Constitution has redefined ‘asli’ (or indigenous) Indonesian to include all citizens who 
have never assumed foreign citizenship by their own free will. This signifies the end to the official 
distinction between ‘asli’ and ‘non-asli’, as all citizens are now legally equal before the law. More recently, 
the government enacted the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination Law (No. 40/2008) to further 
provide protection against discrimination based on race and ethnicity.24 
Despite this positive development, the struggles of the ethnic Chinese for equal rights, 
representation, voice and recognition are still unfinished. ‘Multiculturalism’, argues Tariq Modood, ‘gives 
political importance to a respect for identities that are important to people, as identified in minority 
assertiveness, arguing that they should not be disregarded in the name of integration or 
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citizenship’.25 After decades of silencing, oppression and disempowerment, it will take time for the ethnic 
Chinese to recover their confidence and to assert their rights as full Indonesian citizens. In this respect, 
schools can be an ideal place to empower this minority through multicultural citizenship education. This 
entails a redefinition of ‘citizenship’ to not just legal rights and a passport, but also as ‘plural, dispersed 
and dialogical’.26 Furthermore, within the framework of multicultural citizenship education, national 
identity has to be reimagined as inclusive of multiple elements, and schools should be a place where 
students have the right to debate who should be recognised as Indonesians and the ‘terms of 
recognition’.27 
Research approach and fieldwork techniques 
In a previous study, I surveyed four Chinese Christian schools in Jakarta and presented a macro-analysis 
that demonstrated how schools can be a site for the construction and maintenance of socially exclusive 
and segregated religious, ethnic and class identities.28 My findings attest to the theories of Paul Willis and 
Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron on the role of schools in the reproduction of culture and 
class.29 The present study builds on the earlier investigation, but provides a micro-analysis of the internal 
processes in a particular ‘Chinese’ Christian school in Jakarta. Through schoolyard ethnography — a 
method employed in education research30 — I was able to gain insight into the student dynamics and the 
multifaceted views and identities of the students in the school under study. 
Between July and August 2010, I conducted fieldwork at two campuses of the Olive Tree Christian 
School (pseudonym) in two different locations in Jakarta. Both campuses of the same school provide 
Christian education for students of different social classes (see below). The school offers a national 
curriculum determined by the Ministry of Education and Culture, and prepares its senior high school 
students to sit for the National Exams. Besides schoolyard ethnography, I conducted twenty-two 
individual semi-structured interviews and five focus group discussions (FGDs) with senior school 
administrators, pastors, teachers, counsellors, students, and parents. From Monday to Friday, I arrived at 
the school daily at 7 a.m. and left at around 3 p.m. I conducted participant observations of Year 11 classes 
teaching Citizenship Education, Sociology, History, Religious Education, Character Building, Indonesian 
and Chinese language. I was also participant-observer at school assemblies, weekly chapel services and I 
also observed students in the playground and at the canteen. I studied students socialising before and 
after school, and noted in-class behaviours at both campuses. 
This research focuses on students enrolled in the Social Science (IPS or Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial) and 
the Science (IPA or Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam) streams at senior high school (or SMA, Sekolah Menengah 
Atas) level. The students were aged between 16–18 years. There were an equal number of informants 
drawn from each gender. I targeted this research sample group for their age and level of education which 
enable them to articulate coherent arguments concerning abstract concepts of citizenship, identity, and 
rights of belonging. Further, the students in this age group are aware of the values inculcated through the 
discourses of schools, families and communities. Being at an age when they are considering post-school 
destinations, students at senior high school are particularly cognisant of community values. I selected a 
purposive, non-random sample of students for interviews and FGDs in order to enable me to compare 
and contrast family backgrounds, social class, and religion. My interactions with the informants were 
conducted in Indonesian; interviews and FGDs were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. 
My research design focused on: 
 how the school inculcated values and taught understandings of national unity, and 
shaped attitudes towards ethnic and religious differences; 
 how parents and students selected schools; and 
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 how education in Indonesia articulated the concepts and place of student, family, 
community and school. 
The Olive Tree Christian School: An overview 
The Olive Tree Christian School (OTCS) began in 1952 as a kindergarten and primary school, and only 
started offering lower and upper secondary education in 1958 and 1961 respectively. The school was 
established by the Olive Tree Christian Church, one of the oldest Peranakan (Malay-speaking Chinese) 
Protestant churches in Jakarta. Today, the OTCS has three campuses: the original campus (OTCS I) is 
located in the Chinatown area of Jakarta; the second campus (OTCS II), established in 1995, is situated in 
an exclusive residential estate in West Jakarta with a high concentration of Chinese; and the third campus 
(OTCS III) was set up in 2003 in a new satellite town on the outskirts of Jakarta. 
Private schools in Jakarta are thriving despite a highly competitive private education sector. The 
business environment has made the schools wary of observers such that gaining access to these schools 
is difficult. My previous experience with elite Christian schools in Jakarta revealed the opacity of the field, 
and school administrators' reluctance to provide information on ‘trade secrets’. It was only through 
personal recommendations that I was allowed entry into OTCS. 
Although OTCS is one of the oldest Chinese Christian schools in Jakarta, its growth and expansion 
has been relatively slow compared to that of other Christian schools in the city which were quick to seize 
the lucrative opportunity of providing private education after 1998.31 While other church-established 
Chinese Christian schools are run independently of their synod and parent church, OTCS operates under 
a stringent hierarchy with the synod directly controlling the church, which in turn oversees the education 
foundation that runs the school.32 Under this pecking order, any change of school policy requires the 
school director to acquire approval from the foundation, which in turn requires the approval of the church 
and the synod. This hierarchy reflects the organisational features of the synod, which can be broadly 
characterised as stereotypically ‘Chinese’, i.e. top-down, patriarchal, male-dominated, and seniority-
conscious.33 School administrators themselves contrasted OTCS's ‘conservative’ and outdated ‘Chinese 
familial management style’ with the modern and professional business management model adopted by 
other Chinese Christian schools in Jakarta, and attributed this as the primary factor hindering the school's 
growth.34 I perceived that the synod functioned as gatekeeper of the values of the group and that these 
values were inculcated through the school's curriculum, environment and mission. 
Enrolments in OTCS I and II comprise predominantly ethnic Chinese with some students of mixed 
parentage. Although it is a Protestant Christian school, not all students are Protestants. Catholic and 
Buddhist students make up about 30 per cent of the school population. At both campuses there are only 
a handful of non-Chinese students, most of them Protestants: these non-Chinese, together with an even 
smaller number of non-Christian students, are often presented as an emblem of the multicultural diversity 
of the school, a clear case of tokenism given the homogeneous student landscape. While most of the 
teachers in OTCS I and II are non-Chinese, almost all of them are Christians. It was explained to me in 
interviews with teachers and senior school administrators that few Chinese Indonesians are attracted to 
the teaching profession owing to the meagre salaries. Apparently, a handful of Muslim teachers were 
hired at OTCS I in the early days when Christian teachers were scarce. However, the school has now 
adopted a policy of only recruiting Protestant or Catholic teachers, making its environment even more 
religiously uniform. This recruitment policy has serious implications for multicultural education, which 
requires teachers from a diversity of ethnocultural and religious backgrounds to ‘ensure a richer tapestry 
of cultural knowledge and experience’.35 Without such diversity in the OTCS teaching workforce, the 
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implementation of multicultural education falls on the shoulders of individual teachers who are personally 
committed to such a cause. 
The school conducted a survey a few years ago to find out the reasons behind parents' choice of 
OTCS. My interviews with parents, students and teachers in this study have validated the findings of the 
school's survey. Distance turned out to be the main consideration; most parents chose OTCS because it is 
located near their homes. The other reason was the Christian education that the school provided. I was 
told by several parents that Christian schools are known for their strength of discipline and emphasis on 
character building.36 Leslie J. Francis notes how Christian schools in the United Kingdom immerse students 
in a community committed to a way of life based on belief in the Christian God and scriptures.37 One 
parent at OTCS I argued that it is important for his children to go to a Christian school so that they can 
build a strong faith foundation. He would not mind if his children later entered a state university because 
by that time they would have become witnesses for Christ as ‘salt and light’ and in this way immune to 
the influences of a non-Christian environment.38 
There is generally a lack of parental participation in OTCS. Many parents claim that they are 
preoccupied with their businesses, and that they have put their trust in the school to shape their children's 
worldviews and inculcate proper values. The parents said they appreciated the safe environment — which 
they defined as free from sex and drugs — that the Christian school provided. This perception of a safe 
environment is further enhanced by the almost exclusively Chinese population of the school, a sentiment 
affirmed in their discomfit with state schools which they described as places where Chinese and Christians 
would form minorities. Their unease with state schools was articulated in concerns that included issues 
of race, religion and class. They also perceived state schools as providing an education with low academic 
and unclear moral standards. In summary, the OTCS's appeal to Christian as well as non-Christian Chinese 
parents was based on the exclusive ethnic composition of the student population, the social status of the 
OTCS students and their parents, and the faith-based discipline that the school represented to the parents. 
Non-Christian parents did not see Christianity as a threat or an obstacle to their children obtaining a 
proper moral education; on the contrary, they perceived that the Christian school ethos would inculcate 
sound values in their children. 
Apart from the fact that both OTCS I and II provide a homogeneous ethnic environment, there are 
notable class differences between the two campuses. Located in the older precinct of Jakarta surrounded 
by Chinese-owned businesses, OTCS I caters mainly to lower-middle-class students of Chinese descent 
whose parents usually own a small retail business in the area. Many of these parents originally came from 
the outer provinces of Indonesia, such as West Kalimantan and North Sumatra, to Jakarta to seek a better 
life. Running retail activities in the ‘rough’ environment of Chinatown earned them the stereotype of being 
unrefined, unsophisticated and loud. The children are believed to have inherited such brusqueness from 
the Jakarta Chinatown environment and their upbringing. 
In contrast, parents who send their children to OTCS II come largely from an upper-middle-class 
white-collar background. The parents are either professionals or medium- to large-scale business owners 
and most families live in the exclusive residential estates nearby. Living in a gated community with high 
fences and walls means that the students in OTCS II are more insular and less exposed to people of various 
backgrounds and ethnicities. While students of OTCS I take various kinds of public transport to school and 
are usually quite independent and unescorted, their counterparts in OTCS II are sent to school by their 
chauffeurs or escorted by their maids if they happen to live nearby, and some drive their own motorbikes 
or cars to school. The accessories that the OTCS II students bring to school, including the latest electronic 
gadgets and mobile phones, exemplify their status. The class difference between the two campuses is 
reflected in the fact that OTCS I fees are lower than those for OTCS II. 
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The two campuses also differ in academic standing. Perhaps surprisingly, OTCS I has a better 
academic reputation as evidenced in several awards won by its students in national competitions. In 
contrast, students from OTCS II are better known for sports. This is partly because the campus has a larger 
compound, equipped with two basketball courts, compared to the small yard, cramped buildings and half-
sized multipurpose court of OTCS I. Students from the two campuses also display different attitudes and 
behaviours. Although they appear loud at first, students in OTCS I are generally better-mannered than 
their counterparts in OTCS II. For example, students in OTCS I would rise and greet the teachers who 
entered the classroom while their counterparts in OTCS II tended to ignore their teachers. It was not 
uncommon for students in OTCS II to talk back to their teachers rudely or play with their mobile phones 
or other electronic devices while teachers are teaching. The teachers who were interviewed attributed 
the students' behaviour to their class background. I was told that while students in OTCS II take their 
education and luxurious accessories for granted, their counterparts in OTCS I understood that upward 
mobility depended on their academic achievements. 
This article demonstrates how the differences in social class between students of the two campuses 
also marked a difference in their attitude towards multiculturalism. Because students of OTCS I often had 
to help out in the family retail business in Jakarta's Chinatown, they were exposed to a wider non-Chinese 
community. This enabled students in OTCS I to better appreciate difference as compared to their OTCS II 
counterparts. However, neither openness nor closeness to cultural diversity shaped the attitude of 
students towards citizenship and national belonging. Students from both campuses expressed a feeling of 
otherness within the community — a general feeling which I believe was shaped at home and reinforced 
by the homogeneous school environment in contrast with the diversity of Indonesian society. 
Teaching multiculturalism in a homogeneous environment 
In providing a confessional Christian education in an ethnically homogeneous environment to 
predominantly Chinese students, the Olive Tree Christian School does not offer multiculturalism as a 
‘natural’ experience. One teacher asked how the students could learn about multiculturalism when, ‘the 
only non-Chinese [they meet] are teachers, office boys [sic] and security guards’.39 I emphasise that this 
comment came from a teacher at OTCS I where the students have more exposure to non-Chinese through 
their daily routines (although such interaction may be shallow and limited) such as taking public transport 
and interacting with customers in their parents' shops. One could only imagine what the teacher might 
say of OTCS II students who see non-Chinese in terms of their domestic maids and drivers since OTCS II 
students live in residential cocoons sequestered away from the majority of Indonesians. 
Although the school management espouses the importance of multiculturalism, there is no 
specialised curriculum that addresses education for multiculturalism and tolerance.40 The topic of 
multiculturalism, however, is covered in Year 11 Sociology and there have also been efforts at promoting 
multiculturalism and tolerance in subjects such as Religion Education, Citizenship Education and Character 
Building. The teaching of multiculturalism in these named courses varied, depending on the attitudes of 
individual teachers on the importance of multiculturalism in Indonesian society.41 Those who believed in 
multicultural education shared with me the innovative ideas they had thought out. These methods mostly 
involved the creation of opportunities for their Chinese students to interact with non-Chinese and non-
Christians. Some cited student-exchange programs with pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). There could 
be excursions to cultural and religious venues outside the Chinese Christian community. Inter-school 
sports events and joint-school camps with students from state schools could also be organised. However, 
these ideas remained wishful thinking as none of the teachers had pushed for any of their ideas, perceiving 
that it would be impossible to get approval from the Education Ministry and the respective school and 
organisational administrations, not to mention the consent of parents. 
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Indonesian academic H.A.R. Tilaar argues that multicultural education can only be implemented 
when teachers are themselves living in a multicultural manner.42 Indeed such personal (multi)cultural 
experience is argued as critical to the ability of teachers to transmit this knowledge in schools since 
teachers bring to the classroom their understandings, ideas, explanations and interpretations, all of which 
would have been articulated from personal and therefore subjective experience.43 In an interview I 
conducted with the director of a nongovernmental interfaith organisation in Jogjakarta in 2011, I learned 
of their retreat workshops for teachers from diverse backgrounds and different schools to come together 
to network, hold dialogues and to learn about curriculum writing. For many of these teacher-participants, 
the retreat was the first time they had ever interacted and lived together with people of another faith and 
ethnicity. After spending a few days together, most participants told the organisers that they valued the 
interfaith and interethnic dialogue experience and were inspired to bring the experience back to their 
respective schools through activities that would promote pluralism and multiculturalism. Unfortunately, 
many of them later reported to the organisers that they faced obstacles from their school bureaucracies 
and management as these initiatives were invariably viewed with scepticism and suspicion.44 
In the absence of a specialised multicultural curriculum, it is individual efforts made by teachers that 
define multicultural education in OTCS. In this regard, the efforts of Ibu Lisa, the Chinese principal of OTCS 
I, is exemplary: 
Multicultural and tolerance education is important to us in Indonesia. If we don't teach this to our 
students, they may become an exclusive ethnic group. Their parents are teaching them that as 
Chinese, they should not socialise with non-Chinese… [But] students see that I teach with an 
‘Indonesian manner’ although I myself am ethnic Chinese. In this way, they gradually get used to 
the idea that they can also be Indonesian [while still remaining ethnic Chinese]…. If we keep on 
focusing on differences [between Chinese and pribumi], we may judge the pribumi (indigenous 
Indonesians) and Muslims in a variety of ways. But I teach students that [when a problem occurs] it 
is not Islam and not a [particular] ethnicity that causes it. The problem lies with the person, the 
individual. This way they will value the existence of people who are different from them.45 
Teaching in the ‘Indonesian manner’ for Ibu Lisa involves embodying the meaning of living with difference 
in tolerance and respect. She is a counter-example of the Chinese stereotype — that they are rich, 
business- and money-oriented, live in exclusive residential areas, and are reluctant to socialise with non-
Chinese.46 As a lower middle class ethnic Chinese Christian, Ibu Lisa has been living in a Sundanese Muslim 
majority village in the outskirts of Jakarta for fifteen years. It takes her two to three hours to commute to 
school by public transport every day. Although there are only three Chinese Christian families in the entire 
village where she lives, she feels comfortable and safe as ‘differences are valued’ in the village. According 
to her, there has never been inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflict in her village. Her family often visits 
their neighbours during festive seasons, religious celebrations and family events. Inter-ethnic marriage, 
deemed taboo by most Chinese, is not an issue in her family as her brother married a Javanese Christian 
woman. Living in a multicultural environment, Ibu Lisa teaches multiculturalism in her Citizenship 
Education class using her own experience as an example. She is not alone — several teachers in both OTCS 
I and II come from similar backgrounds, share similar experiences and teach multiculturalism in a similar 
spirit. 
The OTCS is aware of the impact of its exclusive and homogeneous school environment on its 
students. Recognising that its students may not have much experience in interacting with their fellow non-
Chinese citizens, OTCS implements a social program called ‘Live in’ to allow students to go on a short-term 
stay with underprivileged Indonesians in rural villages. This one-week program aims at giving students 
exposure to living with a host family of a different ethnicity and religion and seeks to encourage students 
to learn about their host family's culture, faith and way of life. In organising this program, the school bears 
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a heavy responsibility with regard to safety concerns. In order to address this concern of potential liability, 
the home-stay villages are carefully selected based on recommendations from their network of local 
churches in that area. The school has received positive feedback from students who have experienced the 
program. For instance, a student in OTCS I shared his experience: 
In the program it is the duty of all students to help out their host parents. It happened that my host 
parents are in the chicken processing line of work…. Having host parents who cut chickens meant 
that I had to wake up at three o'clock in the morning to remove the feathers of the chickens so 
that we can cut them. According to me, the ‘Live in’ program is very good because I get to learn 
about different cultures and get acquainted with people from different religions and ethnic 
groups.47 
Although this program allows students to gain exposure to different communities and lifestyles, it is 
limited in its success in initiating organic interaction between students and local residents. One teacher in 
OTCS II revealed that his students still preferred to cluster among themselves and were reluctant to 
socialise with local youth.48 Moreover, the ‘Live in’ program is not novel or exclusive to OTCS. In fact, the 
program is so popular in private schools that it risks becoming a clichéd and tokenistic ‘cultural immersion 
program’ that only serves a superficial function. For instance, the original objective of placing students 
with a host family of a different religion has not been followed through as the OTCS mainly cooperates 
with Christian villages. The school management admits that the villages in Central Java that facilitate such 
home-stay programs have become increasingly commercialised: ‘Instead of allowing students to have 
hands on experience in their farm, some hosts do everything themselves and students are only required 
to watch’. The management of OCTS acknowledges this concern and a school administrator said, ‘We are 
cautious about this as we want our students to participate or the program will lose its meaning’.49 
I hold that tokenism and irrelevance might be the lesser of concerns with regard to the ‘Live-in’ 
programs. Even though unintended, the ‘Live in’ program in fact reinforced class differences between the 
students and the villagers, and highlight a mutual sense of otherness between host communities and the 
students of private schools. To show real commitment to integrating students into the larger Indonesian 
society, programs like ‘Live in’ need to be more than a once-off event, and should be reinforced with other 
activities that can encourage multicultural interactions.50 Tilaar is right to suggest that multicultural 
education should be enshrined in all subjects taught, and integrated into the school culture.51 In other 
words, a whole-school approach is needed for multiculturalism to be successfully taught in school.52 
During my fieldwork, I asked selected students in both campuses to participate in a creative writing 
exercise on a topic related to diversity in Indonesia. The students' essays show that they are generally 
proud of the diversity that exists in the country. For instance, one wrote, ‘Although Indonesia is diverse, 
we should not distinguish ourselves from others nor make enemies with people who are different from 
us in religion and culture. We must think of them as equals and befriend them. I am proud to be part of 
the Indonesian nation which is rich in diversity’ (OTCS II). Another student viewed diversity as ‘colours in 
life’: ‘When there is only one colour in life, human beings will not grow… a diverse society is a society with 
differences but the different elements are all interconnected’ (OTCS I). In one essay entitled, 
‘Diversity = Double Edged Sword’, the student wrote, ‘So what happened to the diversity in Indonesia? 
Indonesia became a chaotic country with all sorts of riots, inter-ethnic and inter-religious wars because of 
differences in understanding and jealousy between ethnic groups’ (OTCS I). 
The assertions of the importance of diversity need to be critically evaluated if they represented 
regurgitation of state ideals spelt out in textbooks. Similar approval of the ‘colourfulness’ of Indonesian 
diversity was found among students of a pesantren in Yogyakarta in Raihani's research.53 The students 
told him that they did not see any problem with being different from others, and asserted that the key to 
harmonious living in diversity is tolerance. Through the years of textbook-centred education using 
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prescribed texts, many Indonesian students have grown up in a discursive habitus 54 of ‘politically correct’ 
thought. Whether Chinese Christians or indigene Muslims, their answers seemed to come right out of the 
textbook. One is left guessing the extent to which the notion of an ideal society of harmonious 
multiculturalism had a basis in their real lives. 
In order to gain further insight into the ‘real’ world of the students, I asked the students about their 
choice of universities after completing high school. More than half of my informants in OTCS I, and not 
surprisingly, all informants in OTCS II, indicated that they would choose to enter private universities in 
Jakarta which have a majority of Chinese students — such as Tarumanagara University, Atma Jaya Catholic 
University, Bina Nusantara University and Pelita Harapan University — rather than state universities. 
Students from a wealthier background, especially those in OTCS II, said they planned to continue their 
tertiary education overseas in Singapore, Australia or the United States. The principal of OTCS I affirmed 
that her students who intended to go on to tertiary study locally preferred a monoethnic university: ‘The 
students are concerned about mixing with people who are different, especially the non-Chinese’. She 
further explained, ‘Not that they don't want to socialise [with the non-Chinese] but they are worried that 
they won't be accepted [by the non-Chinese]’.55 One student said: 
In both school and home environments, we are surrounded by mostly Chinese who are Christians, 
Catholics or Buddhists. Rarely are there Hindus or Muslims. So we have not really experienced real 
society. If we decide to enter the University of Indonesia [UI]… it will be very complex. So many 
different people, how can we handle this if we have not experienced [diversity] in school until 
now?56 
There are various reasons for the reluctance of Chinese students to consider entering public universities 
for tertiary education. Memories of the 1998 anti-Chinese riots are ingrained and kept alive in their minds 
by their parents, for one. Moreover, during the New Order period, the Chinese were the only ethnic group 
that was restricted by a quota for entrance into public universities. This resulted in Chinese Indonesians 
forming a minority in these universities. The quota system was lifted after the 1998 Reform, but the 
minority status and the fear of being marginalised remains. An OTCS I student recounted her sister's 
reluctance to enter the prestigious University of Indonesia (UI) even though she received an offer upon 
passing the tertiary entrance exam: ‘My sister was reluctant (kapok) to enter UI because she was not 
comfortable with the environment. Eventually, she entered a university with all Chinese students’.57 The 
word ‘kapok’, as used by Chinese Indonesians to describe their predicament as members of a resented 
minority, connotes an emotional response of having ‘learnt one's lesson’ or ‘having had enough’ and ‘not 
wanting to go through the same experience again’.58 
Despite telling of her sister's reluctance to enter UI, this informant, and several of her peers at OTCS 
I appeared to be open to the idea of studying at a state university. This student told me that she was 
targeting either the UI or the Institute of Technology, Bandung (ITB), both reputable state universities. By 
way of an explanation for her choice she said, seemingly with no sense of contradiction: ‘In these 
universities we can learn how to adapt to people who have different religions and different ethnicities. I 
am really excited about this.’ Another student in the same FGD appeared to be more pragmatic. She said: 
State universities provide better access to jobs for they have better social networks. Moreover the 
fees are lower [than at private universities], so we don't have to further burden our parents who 
have worked so hard for us. I know that in state universities, if you are Chinese, you will have to 
take a beating (dikerjain habis), but luckily I am of mixed race, and that's my chief advantage; I 
have darker skin.59 
Two students who were doing well academically at OTCS said they wanted to study medicine at UI. One 
said, ‘Initially I was concerned [about entering a state university], but then I realised that I would not grow 
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if I went to a Christian university. If I am in a state university, I can set an example for my new friends and 
ultimately get them to accept Christ.’60 The other student who wanted to do medicine at UI stated: ‘I 
remember participating in a competition with participants from both private and public schools. I did 
make friends with people of different ethnicity and religions. I believe that if I enter UI, there is a great 
chance that I can mix well and not be marginalised.’61 
OTCS I school administrators encourage students to consider public universities for their tertiary 
education, and especially the premier universities such as UI, ITB and Gajah Mada University. The school 
administrators note the great influence parents have on their children with regard to the choice of 
university: ‘The school may try to bridge racial differences… but we can't do much if parents who are 
cultural chauvinists instil their racial prejudice in their children.’62 
Citizenship education: Between apathy and disillusionment 
In an earlier article, I argued that students in elite Chinese Christian schools see citizenship teaching as 
superfluous for they enjoy high social mobility notwithstanding their minority status.63 One manifestation 
of their indifference with regard to notions of citizenship is their dismissive attitude to the subject 
Citizenship Education, which is compulsory in accordance with the curriculum set out by the Ministry of 
Education and Culture. However, I found that the same generalised finding could not be made for the 
effectiveness of citizenship education taught at OTCS. I found nuanced differences in student attitudes 
which appeared to depend on the level of commitment of individual teachers to the belief in the value of 
multiculturalism. 
Considered as a ‘source of social capital’ and ‘democracy in action’,64 Citizenship Education can play 
an important role in a democracy such as Indonesia.65 Under Suharto, the integralist Pancasila ideology 
defined the model of citizenship which was reinforced through the indoctrination of Pancasila Moral 
Education. This subject was replaced by Citizenship Education (PKn or Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan) in 
2002 following considerable debate among educators on what citizenship education would be relevant to 
post-Reformasi Indonesia.66 A PKn teacher at OTCS I explained that Pancasila Moral Education focused on 
the moral element, and encouraged good behaviour in terms of tolerance among different communities; 
PKn, on the other hand, emphasised public institutions and citizenship rights and responsibilities.67 The 
new framework inserts into the ‘civic education model’ principles of democratic systems, civil society and 
the rule of law, as well as the state ideology and civic values of Pancasila. Fearnley-Sander et al. summarise 
the political values of the new curriculum into three objectives: a commitment to Pancasila as the source 
of national identity, a commitment to civic competency, and a rights-oriented view of 
citizenship.68 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this new curriculum in providing ‘social capital’ to create 
active citizens remains to be seen. 
It is widely known that neither Pancasila Moral Education nor Citizenship Education is favoured by 
students: ‘Boring’; ‘Trifling’; ‘Formal’; ‘Have been memorising since primary school’; ‘Don't understand 
the meaning and benefit of it’. These are some of the expressions that have been identified as the 
‘trademark’ responses to Pancasila Education by a lecturer who teaches this subject at a Christian 
university in Surabaya.69 A Citizenship Education (PKn) teacher talked about the ‘mental stress’ that the 
PKn teachers suffer. The teacher told how students perceived PKn teachers as ‘purveyors of accounts of 
reality that contradicted lived experience’ so that PKn teachers were to them ‘Liar Teacher Number 1’.70 
Indeed, PKn is a challenging subject to teach because 1) students do not seem to see much relevance 
in the subject compared to subjects which are deemed more ‘practical’, and 2) students do not believe in 
what is taught as it does not usually correspond to reality. I have observed apathy towards Citizenship 
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Education among students in both campuses of OTCS. To illustrate this, I have reproduced an extended 
account of a Year 11 Citizenship Education (PKn) class at OTCS I from my field notes dated 19 July 2010: 
Pak Anwar, a PKn teacher who is in his late 20s, was a little late for class. When he arrived, he left the 
textbook on the desk and taught interactively. He started the lesson by asking, ‘What is politics?’ 
Before anyone responded, he answered, ‘Politics is all about power.’ He asked, ‘What do we see in 
Indonesian politics?’, and reminded students that Suharto was dictator for 32 years. ‘KORUPSI!’ 
(corruption), he emphasised. ‘Corruption is an abuse of power,’ he added. He further explained, ‘If we 
look at it from the perspective of finance, it is natural to be corrupt. It needs a lot of campaigning to 
get a seat in the MPR [People's Consultative Assembly]. Campaigning is costly — it needs money. 
Politicians need to be rich to run campaigns. Such as…?’, he left it blank for students to fill in. 
‘Prabowo… Wiranto… Jusuf Kalla…!’, the students answered. ‘They are all business people. All of them 
need money,’ said Pak Anwar in a cynical way. He continued, ‘They have invested a lot of capital in 
order to get a seat in the MPR. Of course they would want to recover the capital. So do not be 
surprised that Indonesian politicians are corrupt. Corruption has become entrenched in Indonesia.’ 
Pak Anwar exemplified his point using his friend who is a policeman. He said his friend told him 
that police officers who are honest take a long time to get promoted. Being honest could be seen as 
‘interfering with stability’ (mengganggu stabilitas) [or rocking the boat] and an honest policeman 
could be transferred to isolated places such as Aceh, Papua or the Thousand Islands (Pulau Seribu). 
The students laughed. Pak Anwar wrote on the board: ‘Lord Acton: Power tends to corrupt. Absolute 
power corrupts absolutely’. Students quickly copied it down in their notebooks. Pak Anwar continued, 
‘Power tends to be misused. Absolute power will certainly be misused. We have seen this in Suharto's 
authoritarian rule of the MPR, DPR and military. Ideally, politics is used to build [the nation]. But this 
is not happening here.’ 
Moving on to the topic of political culture, the teacher asked, ‘What is political culture?’ A student 
read the definition straight from the textbook. ‘What about in everyday Indonesia?’, Pak Anwar asked 
again. ‘KORUPSI!’ the students answered. Pak Anwar seemed pleased with their answer. He 
reaffirmed them by saying, ‘This is not just my assertion. Even scholars and experts on Indonesia 
would agree [that it is corrupt]…’ — he looked at me for an affirmation. He concluded the section by 
saying that corruption is the political culture in Indonesia and emphasised, ‘Corruption is deeply 
entrenched…. Yet, it can be possible to have an honest government in Indonesia; not impossible, but 
very difficult… you have to be prepared… it will be difficult’. Pak Anwar now returned to the concepts 
in the textbook and asked students what are the three components in politics. ‘What is the first 
component?’ A student answered, ‘Cognitive’. Pak Anwar gave a brief explanation of this and then 
asked, ‘The second component is…?’, and so on. 
The students seemed very indifferent to the Citizenship Education class. Pak Anwar recognised that 
the students were losing attention. He asked, ‘What did you guys do in PKn class in previous year?’ 
Students answered in unison, ‘We slept’. Pak Anwar shook his head and asked the students to take 
out a piece of paper. The students moaned and protested. Pak Anwar wrote an essay question on the 
board: ‘Compare the political culture between the Reformasi Order and the New Order’. He asked 
them to write their thoughts freely in any format they want. He then walked around to help students 
with their queries until the bell rang. 
The humour in the account above is one of black comedy. Pak Anwar used the favourite bogeyman of the 
corrupt politician and the corrupt civil servant to arouse student attention. Playing to the gallery proposed 
distrust in the leaders of government. He set himself ‘on side’ with the students, which in turn undermines 
any authority or legitimacy the government might have. But the implication for nationhood is worrying. If 
the state is undermined, then too would civic pride in citizenship. While I agree that corruption appears 
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to be endemic to Indonesia, what is worrying is the conflation of corruption with government and civic 
institutions. This must be a well-rehearsed narrative as students appear to be convinced that PKn teaching 
is the telling of lies, even though Pak Anwar seemed in his PKn lesson to be telling the ‘truth’. In my 
interviews, the informants seemed unanimous in their belief in the gap between how the government is 
portrayed in PKn class and how politics is ‘actually’ practised on the ground. ‘State principles only appear 
in the book and never in practice,’ said one student.71 One OTCS II student said, ‘Political practices in 
Indonesia are very different from the theories taught.’72 Another student opined, ‘PKn is boring. The 
teacher is boring and the material is boring. The material taught in PKn focuses on laws and regulations. 
We know that in Indonesia most laws and regulations are only formulated but are not 
implemented.’73 One student more thoughtfully commented, ‘PKn keeps repeating itself — laws, political 
practices, and so on. It is more important to change the mentality, not keep emphasising knowledge of 
state ideology. Our nation failed because our mentality is wrong, doesn't matter how much we know 
about the ideology.’74 
The disgruntled reception of PKn reveals that ethnic Chinese students are not apolitical or disloyal 
citizens, as the stereotype would have it. Instead, their contempt for PKn classes revealed their 
disillusionment with the state. Their disappointment was eloquent in their comments. When asked 
whether they loved Indonesia, the majority of student-informants at both campuses replied affirmatively. 
However, some OTCS II students from wealthy families who knew that they would be sent overseas for 
further studies were transparent about their apathy and disillusionment with the state. Having the means 
to escape, they could confront more openly their sense of being let down. The ambivalence of these 
students was clear, ‘Sometimes the feeling of love towards our country is defeated by our sadness and 
shame for Indonesia. But what can we do?’75 In a PKn class in OTCS II, a student asked the teacher why 
they needed to learn about political participation if they knew that, ‘at the end of the day, politics is about 
lies and corruption’. The student also asked when Indonesia would become developed and democratic 
like Western countries. The teacher, whether wishing to align her reply to student sentiment or honestly 
reflecting personal opinion, replied, ‘The day will come’.76 
One lone student who, by his exception, proved the rule of gloom said, ‘There is certainly the feeling 
of shame when we think of the corruption and backwardness [of Indonesia]. But my Religion Education 
teacher taught me that everything happens for a purpose. It is not a coincidence that I was born in 
Indonesia and became an Indonesian citizen. My role is to be a good citizen and to build Indonesia.’ The 
student said that PKn lessons were self-affirmative: ‘We are taught that even we, a double minority, 
Chinese and Christian, have the same rights as other ethnic and religious groups. I don't have to feel 
inferior.’77 
The post-1998 national education reform and decentralisation have given rise to a new governance 
model called School-Based Management (SBM), which gives teachers more authority to develop their 
curriculum and decide learning approaches and materials.78 This new model notwithstanding, the usual 
pattern of Indonesian education is still textbook-and-teacher-centric.79 In the field notes of the Citizenship 
Education class in OTCS I reproduced above, although Pak Anwar attempted to depart from the usual 
pattern of Indonesian classroom interaction, he nonetheless returned to the textbook for concepts that 
students had to learn. This textbook-centric teaching reflects the reality of the National Exams which 
require the regurgitation of standard ideas. Between his teaching about the ‘reality’ of corruption and the 
idealised ‘proper’ textbook knowledge, Pak Anwar's PKn lesson was a cynical lesson in citizenship. 
Although Pak Anwar attempted to engage with the new, critical approach to knowledge, which is 
now encouraged, he did not try to provide an alternative framework for the students to consider. The 
effect of his approach could be to reinforce the system which he attempts to mock. Students' response 
can be profoundly disturbing. For example, a student I interviewed after Pak Anwar's PKn class said: 
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Pak Anwar once asked, ‘If you are in a wealthy position, would you be corrupt?’ The thing is, he 
told us that a businessperson who is not corrupt can only earn enough to buy a car and a small 
house. Honestly, if I am going to be a businessman I will certainly be corrupt because I want the 
money, I want glamour.80 
H.A.R Tilaar argues that, ‘Education is a process of internalisation of morals of young generation; therefore 
it is a means in deterring corruption in a society’ (English in original).81 In fact, he is optimistic that the 
new Education Law of 2003 could function to combat corruption by promoting discipline and good morals 
in its civic and multicultural curriculum. Again, the key lies in having dedicated teachers to inculcate such 
values. As such, I recall the words of Ibu Lisa, the Chinese principal of OTCS I, who also teaches PKn, and 
who attempts to teach her Chinese students a belief in the rights of citizenship: 
I always stress to my students that you are Indonesian. If someone asks whether you are 
Chinese, answer them ‘Yes’, and what is wrong with being Chinese? When you are not treated 
as an Indonesian [i.e. if you are discriminated against], you have to exercise your rights as an 
Indonesian.82 
Would the ethnic Chinese students see themselves in the model of Ibu Lisa who is quietly assertive of her 
rights as an Indonesian citizen, or in the figure of Pak Anwar, who makes it clear that PKn is all just a farce 
and nobody is going to be fooled? 
Conclusion 
Reformasi, the democratisation and decentralisation process that took place after Suharto's downfall in 
1998, has opened new possibilities for the promotion of multiculturalism. The post-Suharto education 
reform has spawned the new Education Act of 2003 and the 2007 Guide to ‘The application of the 
multicultural education model for the secondary level’, among other policies. Pancasila Moral Education, 
a top-down ideology, was also replaced with a more accessible Citizenship Education course. But 
according to Raihani, there is little substance to the new rhetoric: he argued that the Indonesian 
government does not have a ‘clear vision for multicultural education in the school curriculum’.83 It appears 
that most teachers are still not familiar with the concept of ‘multicultural education’, and thus have not 
incorporated the notion into their teaching. Teachers who are accustomed to teaching a state-dictated 
curriculum are now expected to act autonomously with limited support from central governments.84 
Although the difference between asli and non-asli has been dissolved so that the ethnic Chinese are 
no longer just Indonesians ‘by virtue of papers’, psychologically, it will take longer for them to be confident 
enough to exercise their full citizenship rights. Schools play an important role in instilling a sense of an 
imagined community in young minds. This micro-analysis of Olive Tree Christian School's pedagogy 
demonstrates Will Kymlicka's proposition that education for citizenship needs to go beyond civics classes 
and must include teaching in the family, in neighbourhoods, churches and in civil society.85 In other words, 
a whole-school approach is needed for multiculturalism to be successfully implemented. As schools are a 
microcosm of the nation-state, successful multicultural education can have real societal implications given 
its potential to bring to life the idealism enshrined in the national motto ‘Unity in Diversity’. 
Multiculturalism is not a natural experience in many religious and private schools and so it has to be 
taught. No matter how valiant the effort of a religious school, with apathetic parents and students 
cocooned in their own ethnic and religious ‘bubbles’, teaching multiculturalism can be an insurmountable 
task. High schools may be seen by wealthier Chinese parents as a transition time, when their children are 
merely being prepared for an education overseas. How else can we judge programs like the ‘Live in’ 
program? At best it is naïve to expect a week-long program to dismantle long-standing socially constructed 
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differences — in race and class — between the Chinese and non-Chinese. At worst it is a tool for the 
reproduction of class and ethnic inequalities, for on the contrary, such artificially-managed interactions 
are not innocent of consequences. When people across ethnic, religious and social boundaries are brought 
together in transient meetings that do not allow time for true understanding, what might be left could be 
surface impressions that reinforce stereotypes and reify difference. 
It is perhaps helpful to be reminded of that lone optimist in the midst of the disillusioned student 
body: he took away lessons from PKn and Religion Education classes to ‘be a good citizen and to build 
Indonesia’, in spite of the multitude of problems and corruption in the country. He also learned to 
embrace his ‘double minority’ status of being Chinese and Christian, and to know his citizenship rights. 
The example of such a student brings hope and reminds us of the potential of multicultural education to 
empower young people. Multiculturalism is not only about understanding and tolerance, it is about 
moving away from passivity to take charge as actors. It is necessary for schools to actively implement 
multicultural citizenship education in order to create a new generation of young adults who are 
empowered, tolerant, active, participatory citizens of Indonesia. 
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